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Enter the jargon: the intertextual rhetoric of Radical Economic 
Transformation following the logic of Demosthenes’s oratory
Michael Kgomotso Masemola
College of Human Sciences, University of South Africa (UNISA), Pretoria, South Africa
ABSTRACT
This paper considers the timing and entry into public discourse of 
‘Radical Economic Transformation’ as a concept that is open to 
deliberate misinterpretation in the media. Whilst, as the title sug-
gests, it is necessary to distil the content signified by its rhetorical 
signposts, the diverse uses to which ‘radical economic transforma-
tion’ is being put by the media, government and researchers 
requires examination relative to parameters of debate set by the 
Greek orator Demosthenes’s thesis in his Against Meidias, during 
times of political crisis in Athens Macedonian expansion. Similarly, 
in the wake of oligarchies and deepening economic inequality 
along racial lines, Jacob Zuma’s Radical Economic Transformation 
(RET) was intended to be a bulwark against further expansion, 
exploitation and pauperization. In its intention, the rhetoric RET 
signposted a pro-poor intervention for ownership, management 
and control of the economy in favour of all South Africans. If the 
exordium is whether ‘Radical Economic Transformation’ should be 
embraced, then the debate takes stock of the observation by Mark 
Swilling that while there is a clear need for ‘radical economic 
transformation,’ there are concerns that ‘this is being used as an 
ideological smokescreen to mask the rent-seeking practices of the 
Zuma-centred power elite’ (Bhorat et al., 2017). In the media, 
Schutte argues that Radical Economic Transformation is part of 
a ‘distorted discourse [which] is the weapon of choice [at a time 
when] empty rhetoric is served up on Orwellian platters’. Following 
the logic of Demosthenes, the debate around the rhetoric of Radical 
Economic Transformation demands and deserves to be tested 
against legality, justice, expediency, practicability, decency and 
consequences.
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The intertextual bent of the rhetoric of Radical Economic Transformation
Whereas, broadly speaking, it is necessary to lay bare the reasons for an examination of 
Radical Economic Transformation by way of Winnie Obike’s appropriation of Wright’s 
theoretical method of rhetorical criticism to ‘trace the history of ideas [such as Radical 
Economic Transformation] through speeches and political discourse’,1 the sheer pointed-
ness of its singular definition underscores an interventionist urgency. The term Radical 
Economic Transformation ‘came to prominence after President Jacob Zuma delivered the 
ANC’s January 8 anniversary statement at the Orlando Stadium in Soweto in 2017, and has 
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since been widely used in public discourse’.2 At policy level Radical Economic 
Transformation has a basis in the South African Government’s Medium Term Strategic 
Framework for the 2014–2019 electoral term. However, for some observers, the nationa-
lization aspect of Radical Economic Transformation indicates an inclination towards – if 
not an extension of – the ANC’s National Democratic Revolution in an untenable neo- 
liberal economy that has overshadowed a series of macroeconomic policies since 1994 
(Mosala et al., 2017, p. 234). The African National Congress (ANC) as the ruling party in 
South Africa, is the custodian of RET, meaning as a matter of principle all its members 
including the Deputy President at the time, Cyril Ramaphosa subscribed to the RET and 
had to serve as its implementation agents in the public office. Jacob Zuma, by virtue of 
being the party head as well as the Head of State, automatically became the face and the 
primary champion of RET. For a number of reasons, the RET remained a rhetoric that did 
not manifest into pragmatic interventions that change people’s lives. Vusi Gumede points 
out that in President Jacob Zuma’s public speeches, President Zuma has described radical 
economic transformation as ‘fundamental change in the structure, systems, institutions 
and patterns of ownership, management and control of the economy in favour of all South 
Africans, especially the poor, the majority of whom are African and women’.3 This is more 
direct in comparison to the delineation of what President Zuma prioritizes:
The President of the Republic of South Africa has defined radical socio-economic transforma-
tion as ‘transforming the structure of the economy through industrialisation, broad-based 
black economic empowerment, and through strengthening and expanding the role of the 
state in the economy.’ Doing so will jump-start the economy and will ensure that we meet the 
National Development Plan (NDP) target of 5% growth. (DTI Strategic Plan 2014-2019, p. 10)
While Mark Swilling et al (3) cautiously ‘agree with the intentions’ of commitment to the 
necessity of Radical Economic Transfromation, so defined, it is not difficult to discern the 
obvious intertextuality in the foregoing formulaic description of Radical Economic 
Transformation. The latter’s emphasis on ‘ownership, management and control’ is 
a conception that readily calls to mind Ngugi wa Thiong’o in his Moving the Centre, 
from as far back as 1993, where he rues: ‘It is of course true that imperialism, in whatever 
form and guise, aims at the complete ownership, management and control of the entire 
system of production, exchange and distribution of the wealth in its home base and those of 
other nations and territories’.4 Similarity here denotes African intertextuality and an anti- 
imperial, if decolonial, thrust. If Ngugi’s idea of the complete ownership, management and 
control of the entire system of production, exchange and distribution of the wealth 
prompted this specific way in which radical economic transformation is defined, then 
the intertextuality that is much in evidence lends credence to finding African solutions to 
African problems. It does not end there. For Davies, as it was for Ngugi, it is important to 
‘bring about fundamental changes in the productive structure of our economy and also in 
the patterns of ownership, participation and management in favour of the majority of the 
population’.5
To the extent that, by its intention at any rate, the articulation of anti-imperialism in 
Radical Economic Transformation finds expression in decrying – and reversing – the 
exploitative patterns of what has been identified as ‘White Monopoly Capital’,6 it is 
possible to compare President Jacob Zuma’s effort with those of the orator and statesman 
Demosthenes. Significantly, James Fredal focuses on ‘Demosthenes’ oration Against 
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Meidias to illustrate the role of ‘action’ as an independent art of character-presentation 
and to sketch out its importance in ancient Athenian rhetorical arts.7 Despite the occa-
sional public mis-pronunciation or interspersion of Radical Economic Transformation 
(RET) – often with with the levity of mirth in some speeches by President Jacob Zuma – 
it is important here to note that as global oligarchies expand, exploit and exclude the 
black majority in South African economic life, the need for him to frame his rhetorical 
action as an intention to reverse inequality, poverty and unemployment on the plank of 
‘anti-White Monopoly Capital’ policy had become both urgent and spectacular. In the 
fashion of Demosthenes, the urgency expressed in this rhetoric seems a ‘scare tactic 
rhetoric meant not only to excite public alarm but also give him [President Zuma] the 
edge over rival leaders’.8
More than that, President Zuma posits the thesis of Radical Economic Transformation 
as an anti-thesis to White Monopoly Capital, thereby gesturing the ruling party – the 
African Nation Congress – towards a stance that is diametrically opposed to the exclusive 
and exploitative logic of global capital. In this scenario, it is important to point at the 
similar lens with which Demosthenes views Macedonian expansion into (and annexation 
of) Athens as a threat that requires confrontational rhetorical action. I am thus persuaded 
by Lois Agnew’s identification with Charles Martindale’s argument that the complex chain 
of receptions of, say, Demosthenes ‘has the effect that a work can operate across history 
obliquely in unexpected ways’.9
Whilst one reception celebrates Demosthesnes as an astute statesman in his anti- 
Macedonian thesis – much in the same fashion as President Zuma launches his anti-White 
Monopoly Capital RET rhetoric unexpectedly – Ian Worthington avers that according the 
progymnasmata thesis, an examination of a particular subject of dispute (such as Radical 
Economic Transfromation) ought to be opened up to multi-dimensional scrutiny. The 
issue of dispute may involve politics, theology, morality, or philosophy or, as in the 
present case, policy. The policy of Radical Economic Transformation was further empha-
sized by the Trade and Industry Minister at the May launch of the ninth Industrial Policy 
Action Plan (IPAP), which is aimed at accelerating the implementation of government’s 
policy around the industrialisation of the country’s economy.10 It is here that Rob Davies 
declared that ‘IPAP forms an integral part of radical economic transformation’.11 It is thus 
necessary to argue both sides of a question in the same essay, in a point-counter point 
fashion.
Demosthenes may well have been nothing more than a political opportunist, operating at the 
expense of his country’s best interests for his own political advancement. Philip [or, in the 
present case, White Monopoly Capital], was his stepping-stone to political ascendancy, not 
some greater ideal of his country’s freedom.12
In the contemporary media setting, Gillian Schutte13 draws from George Monbiot and 
Manuela Cadelli, further to argue that Radical Economic Transformation is part of 
a ‘distorted discourse [that] is the weapon of choice [at a time when] empty rhetoric is 
served up on Orwellian platters’.14 To crystallize this point, she boldly asserts that:
Many ANC politicians are pushing this progressive sounding rhetoric without an iota of self- 
consciousness about the fact that under a right wing economic model radical transformation 
is a farce, if not a downright lie. What they rely on to peddle this false hope to their 
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constituency is that the majority of people in the world do not really understand what 
neoliberalism is and how it impacts on their lives.15
In light of the above observation by Gilllian Schutte, it is worth following the logic of 
Demosthenes, and the progymnasmata standard on the debate around the rhetoric of 
Radical Economic Transformation: does it pass the test of legality, justice, expediency, 
practicability, decency and consequences? Katleho Sekhotho reports that the former 
Public Protector Advocate Thuli Madonsela spoke on the sidelines of a democracy dialo-
gue at Constitution Hill, indicating there is no legality in implementing RET . . . ‘a policy 
that has not been consulted on, written down or made clear cannot be implemented’.16 
For Madonsela it obvious already that ‘South Africa has the Equality Act, which is the 
policy meant to advance economic and social transformation’.17
In this sense, its legality is in question. It seems clear that Professor Madonsela’s point 
on legality pivots on the manner in which the policy has not been formally promulgated 
into law, which points prompts her to further argue about the unconstitutionality of such 
a policy. What is significant, though, is that there is a suggestion from Madonsela that 
there is no accountability provided for. In not so many words, for Madonsela the Radical 
Economic Transformation policy represents a Trojan horse for State Capture through the 
Treasury doorway. However, it is instructive to refer to the structured pattern of rent- 
seeking that is graphically depicted in Figure 1 below by Ivor Chipkin of the State Capacity 
Research Group, who made a submission to Parliament’s portfolio committee of public 
enterprises.
Figure 1. Ivor Chipkin’s diagram of the architecture of the shadow state behind state capture (http:// 
47zhcvti0ul2ftip9rxo9fj9.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Screen-Shot-2017- 
08-01-at-7.51.42-PM-1024x487.png).
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On the sidelines of the JSE-listed Richemont’s Annual General Meeting held in Geneva 
on Wednesday in early September 2017, Johann Rupert – apparently the richest man in 
South Africa – was blunt in stating that ‘Radical economic transformation is just a code 
word for theft’18 whilst President Zuma aims to use the policy to reduce poverty, inequal-
ity and unemployment. Rupert, the iconic figure and synecdoche of ‘White Monopoly 
Capital’ chalks down Radical Economic Transformation to an excuse: ‘They’re raiding the 
state’s coffers. And it’s public knowledge’.19
This view is not the sole preserve of ‘White Monopoly Capital’; for earlier on in April 15 
2017, on the occasion of the launch of Dr Khulu Mbatha’s scathing book, Unmasked: Why 
the ANC failed to Govern (2017), China Dodovu had expressed his skepticism towards the 
idea or policy of Radical Economic Transformation. China Dodovu made bold to assert 
that ‘RET policy is nothing but a hollow and radically sounding proposition that lacks 
underpinnings, ostensibly to defeat the white monopoly capital, used by those who want 
to deflate our focus from the filthy Gupta family and to loot, plunder and pillage the 
public resources and to tag anyone who opposes it as an enemy or enemy agent.’20
In Jacques Pauw’s discussion of the circumstances surrounding the removal of Pravin 
Gordhan in The President’s Keepers (2017), he reveals that, having insisted on taxation on 
all tax benefits, including fringe benefits, the Minister of Finance was removed on the 
pretext of accelerating Radical Economic Transformation: ‘Zuma reshuffled his cabinet to 
kickstart a “radical phase of socio-economic transformation”’ (139).21 This view of 
a corrupt shadow state resonates strongly with what emerges from the findings of the 
State Capture Research Group:
It has been argued in [the] report that from about 2012 onwards the Zuma-centred 
power elite has sought to centralise the control of rents to:
eliminate lower-order, rent-seeking competitors. The ultimate prize
was control of the National Treasury to gain control of the Financial
Intelligence Centre (which monitors illicit flows of finance), the Chief
Procurement Office (which regulates procurement and activates legal
action against corrupt practices), the Public Investment Corporation
(the second largest shareholder on the Johannesburg Securities
Exchange), the boards of key development finance institutions, and the
guarantee system (which is not only essential for making the nuclear
deal work, but with a guarantee that state entities can borrow from
privatelenders/banks without parliamentary oversight). The cabinet
reshuffle in March 2017 has made possible this final control of the
National Treasury.22 (Bhorat et al., 2017, p. 17)
Notably, the RET was used as a trump card for Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s (NDZ) ANC 
Presidential campaign, seen by many as an extension of Jacob Zuma’s reign. While it is 
true that NDZ is Zuma’s ex-wife and that they have children together, this does not 
dismiss the fact that she is a distinguished leader in her own right and was a formidable 
presidential candidate. Her adoption of the Zuma camp’s ideological stance through the 
continuation of the RET, was not so much about her being used as a proxy, more than her 
being the primary benefactor of Zuma’s cadre of loyal supporters. In essence, RET is an 
ideological stance that would have determined public policy, should NDZ campaign have 
triumphed over Ramaphosa’s CR17.
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It becomes all the more clear how control of the key levers of the economy was 
concretised through corrupt lines of patronage that are epitomized by the ‘Premier 
League of Premiers’ and latterly beleaguered Gupta family, in the guise of Radical 
Economic Transformation. Despite these unhealthy developments, Rob Davies, the 
Minister of Trade and Industry, sees differently and much suggests that the rot in the 
system of both capture and inequality can be redeemed through Radical Economic 
Transformation:
We’ve got to bring about a radical change in production structures and inclusion. We’ve got 
to bring this about to place us on a higher growth path . . . We cannot any longer afford to be 
an economy whose position is determined by the fact that we are producers and exporters of 
primary mineral resources. That is what colonialism defined our role as. We need to move 
away from that.23
The many faces of radical economic transformation
As evidenced above, there is a hardly any doubt today that Radical Economic 
Transformation now exhibits the properties of a Derridian pharmakon24: it is both poison 
and cure for the socio-economic inequality generated by unipolar white economic 
privilege that arises out of the Sunset Clauses of the South African political settlement 
and the State Capture scandal. The extent of the latter capture was also exposed by 
Magda Wierzycka, CEO of Sygnia Asset Management, who elucidated the role that 
established business such as KPMG played. To take the idea of Radical Economic 
Transformation-as-pharmakon further, especially as it brings the economy to the centre, 
it is worth looking at it from the lens of Marian Hobson (1998) who illuminates the point 
that ‘As a pharmakon, logos is at once good and bad; it is not at the outset governed 
exclusively by goodness or truth’.25 This article does not intend to equate President Jacob 
Zuma’s advocacy for Radical Economic Transformation with the political oratory of 
Demosthenes, even where there are parallels between the anti-Macedonian stance and 
the anti-White Monopoly Capital rhetoric. Rather, it observes that both leaders have 
demonstrated a distinct ability to respond to political threats by switching policy during 
a political crisis, especially where there is an exploitation of what Ian Worthington calls 
‘scare tactic rhetoric meant not only to excite public alarm but also give him 
[Demosthenes] the edge over rival leaders’.26
As the December 2017 elective Conference of the ruling African African National 
Congress drew near, the boldness with which Radical Economic Transformation has 
been articulated as a trump card now depends on the version of RET punted. The more 
refined – and notably different from the last – the better it is for the ANC leader in the 
leadership succession battle. Or is it?
For Vusi Gumede, the ANC – as outlined in its 2017 Strategy and Tactics discussion 
document – makes a point that ‘the campaign for radical economic transformation should 
encompass efforts to change the structure of the economy to advance manufacturing and 
beneficiation, investment of more resources in productive activities, and comprehensive 
broad-based economic empowerment’.27 More than participation, argues Gumede, the 
development of a capable developmental state is a RET goal that is linked to creating and 
strengthening a capable developmental state in a way that is linked to the 2014 to 2019 
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Medium Term Strategic Framework. The shift from discussing Radical Economic 
Transformation as a variegated political discourse via the ANC rather than the exclusive 
articulation by the President is deliberate: the fissures within the party are subtly contest-
ing ownership of the Radical Economic Transformation policy and providing more and 
more refined versions to supplement that propounded by the President. For instance, the 
Secretary-General of the ANC, Gwede Mantashe says Radical Economic Transformation is 
an effort to ensure that ‘the majority of South Africans must have access to ownership and 
control of the South African economy, and the state must facilitate that.’28 Since this 
Radical Economic Transformation delineation involves ownership and control, a la Ngugi, 
it goes further to emphasize the role of the State. With ever-rising inequality, poverty and 
unemployment, the facilitation of such a transfer of ownership is necessary.
Yet it is also as over-simplistic as it is over-enthusiastic in its interventionist assump-
tions. In The Financial Mail, Claire Bisseker insists that ‘Poverty, unemployment and 
inequality in SA, though deep-seated, can be resolved without resort to radical populist 
policies which are based on untruths about the economy that should be rejected’.29 
Certainly, this cautionary stance reflects the prevalent mood much earlier in 2017 when 
President Jacob Zuma was taken to task by opposition parties over the overarching theme 
of his address – radical socio-economic transformation – during the State of the Nation 
debate in Parliament. Yet, ironically, it also seems clear that the SAVE SA marches and their 
campaign in April 2017 also pointed to the corruption of accounting firms such as KPMG 
in enabling state capture (see Figure 2). One example is the anti-trust collusion since 
April 2015 by 17 Banks, local and international, as they were involved in price-fixing and 
market allocation in the trading of foreign currency pairs – contrary to the Competition 
Act. Another is the case of a listed company such as Markus Jooste’s Steinhoff that show 
the darker side of ‘White Monopoly Capital’ in the deliberate theft and loss of billions of 
Figure 2. SaveSA eyewitness account.
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rand in accounting for Public Investment Company (PIC) investment. Mark Swilling et al 
describe the PIC as ‘the second largest shareholder on the Johannesburg Securities 
Exchange’ (2017, p. 17). Billions in pension funds investment were lost and not even 
accounted for by Steinhoff as any corporate citizen would have. Like the Gupta family, 
Steinhoff had their auditing fudged by accounting firms that colluded with Steinhoff in 
a multi-billion rand corporate failure scandal. However, the staggering figures and cost to 
the South African economy seem to suggest that ‘corporate failure’ is as much invidious as 
‘State capture’. Both are contributing to corporate meltdown in comparable proportion to 
state capture.
In light of the above-mentioned corporate failure and even meltdown caused by 
private sector companies, former President Zuma’s rhetoric against ‘White Monopoly 
Capital’ becomes justified as it was when Demosthenes decried the annexure of Athens. 
In the event that State Capture prompts prosecution, as is the case now, corporate 
meltdown deserves it equally.
In sum: contesting the rhetoric of RET in context
Whilst the rhetoric of radical economic transformation (RET) echoes in many intertextual 
ways Ngugi wa Thiongo’s clamour for the ‘ownership, management and control of the 
economy’, Vusi Gumede (2017) avers that it also shows how former President Jacob Zuma 
had a clear agenda that sought to address the poverty, unemployment and inequality 
couched in rhetorical gestures. This was not much unlike the rhetorical bent of 
Demosthenes as he addressed the burning issues of Athens. The latter, deemed the 
greatest orator of all time, proceeded in a logic that simultaneously posited a thesis and 
anti-thesis in what James Fredal (252) describes as Demosthenes’ oration Against Meidias, 
which ostensibly served to illustrate the role of ‘action’ as an independent art of character- 
presentation.
In much the same way that Demosthenes saw fit to confront the Macedonian expan-
sion into (and annexation of) Athens as a threat that requires confrontational rhetorical 
action, President Zuma sought to address the pressing challenges of poverty, inequality 
and unemployment through Radical Socio-Economic Transformation. To the extent that 
the programme is backed by the Medium Term Strategic Framework (2014–2019), RET 
emphasizes growth and inclusiveness, not just increased involvement by the State in the 
economy. In a country with such stark inequality, entrenched poverty and high unem-
ployment, the moral argument for RET is strong and the RET programme expresses the 
political will of the ruling party to address these issues. At face value, this makes RET pass 
the test of legality, justice, expediency, practicability and decency for the majority of poor 
South Africans.
However, Gillian Schutte (2017) will have us throw caution to the wind: RET is at best 
a ‘distorted discourse’ and at worst empty rhetoric ‘served up on Orwellian platters’ 
because it is impossible to rollout this economic intervention on the back of an economy 
that pursues neo-liberal imperatives. Priorities of the market and trade tariffs that do not 
promote equality in trade make it impossible to roll this RET programme out since, in 
a crude sense, the growth in the economy – however sluggish or pegged at 5% according 
to the NDP target – will not have a corresponding growth in the economic well-being of 
the poor majority. In this scenario, JSE-listed companies will benefit in increased profits 
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and the inequality will increase further still. On the obverse side, such growth will 
legitimize the ill-gotten gains of listed companies through anti-trust behavior and corpo-
rate failure and/or meltdown on the scale of State Capture. If, as Johann Rupert and Mark 
Swilling et al point out in different places, RET is a means of raiding the Treasury, then the 
corollary is the raiding of the JSE that arises from economic growth that is not people- 
focused but profit-based in favour of private companies. Of the latter, Steinhoff is the 
most notorious example in respect of the PIC – a company that manages funds in the 
order of almost R2 trillion in government employees’ pensions, amongst others. Beyond 
Steinhoff the PIC – for all it is worth – is also a target of State Capture head honchos, in the 
name of Radical Economic Transformation. As both sides (the ‘White Monopoly Capital’ 
legion, on the one hand, and the RET rentier pack, on the other) of the economic assault 
go for the jugular, the RET jargon cannot save the day.
The radical edge of the RET rhetoric – however much desirable in some quarters and 
perplexing in others – is devoid of a systematic rollout plan that will guarantee the much- 
needed ownership, management and control of the economy by the poor South African 
majority rather than what Chipkin and Swilling (2018) have aptly described as the Shadow 
State. As was the case with Demosthenes and Meidias, the intensity of enmity in the RET 
rhetoric is not between former President Jacob Zuma and ‘White Monopoly Capital’: it 
marks the blue-print of economic freedom being torn up by elements of the Shadow 
State whose patronage and rent extraction networks aggrandize themselves. RET thus 
becomes a poisoned chalice to the poor majority in need of economic emancipation; yet 
it is also an elixir to the rentier class embedded within the infrastructure of the Shadow 
State.
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